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Summary
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), the Administration
announced plans to establish a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as a multi-agency
effort to be administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where several
watch lists are being consolidated into a single terrorist screening database (TSDB).
The TSC is the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by the Administration
to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected terrorists, and their
supporters.  The other two are the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  According to the Administration,
the TSC complements the FBI-led FTTTF’s efforts to prevent terrorists from entering
the United States, and to track and remove them if they manage to enter the country.
The TTIC serves as a single locale where terrorism-threat data from all sources are
further analyzed to more critically focus on terrorism. 
Certain terrorist identification and watch list functions previously performed by
the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) have been
transferred to the TTIC and TSC under HSPD-6.  At the TTIC, intelligence analysts
are building a Terrorist Identities Database (TID) based on TIPOFF — the U.S.
government’s principal terrorist watch list database prior to HSPD-6.  From TID
records, TSC analysts are building a consolidated TSDB.  The Administration plans
to widen access to, and use of, lookout records by making them available in a
“sensitive but unclassified” format to authorized federal, state, local, territorial and
tribal authorities; to certain private sector entities; and to certain foreign
governments.  
Merging watch lists will not likely require integrating entire systems, but  there
are likely to be technological impediments to merging watch list records.  From
system to system, and watch list to watch list, there remains no standardization of
data elements, such as, name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, or biometric
identifiers.  While elevating and expanding the terrorist identification and watch list
function is an important step in the wider war on terrorism, additional work will
remain to upgrade and integrate other consular and border management systems,
criminal history record systems, and biometric systems.  
HSPD-6 presents significant opportunities to more effectively share data and
increase security, but there are risks as well, not the least of which is the potential
loss of privacy and the erosion of civil liberties.  In recent hearings, Members of
Congress have raised several related issues.  For example, is the TSDB fast, accurate,
comprehensive, and accessible?  Have procedures been established to allow persons,
who may be misidentified as terrorists or terrorist supporters, some form of redress
and remedy if they are denied civil rights or unduly inconvenienced by a screening
agency?  Does the establishment of the TSDB require new guidelines and oversight
mechanisms to protect privacy and other civil liberties?  Or, are existing agency
policies under which such data is collected sufficient?  Is the FBI the best agency to
administer the TSDB?  Are the TSC and TSDB, and by extension the TTIC,
temporary or permanent solutions?  This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
HSPD-6 and Terrorist Watch List Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Terrorist Watch-Listing Prior to HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Watch Lists and Lookout Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Terrorism-Related Ground for Inadmissability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Diplomatic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Failures to Identify, Watch-List, and Screen 9/11 Hijackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Elevating and Expanding Terrorist Identification, Screening, and 
Tracking under HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TTIC and IAIP Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Expanding Use of Terrorist Watch Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
TSC Level of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Legal Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
TSC Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Selected Watch List, Criminal, and Biometric Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
GAO Watch List Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
TIPOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II) . . . . 28
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) . . . . . . . . . 29
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Regional Information Sharing System/Law Enforcement Online . . . . 32
Biometric Systems for Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Possible Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A.  Frequently Used Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
List of Figures
Figure 1.  TIPOFF and Immigration/Border Inspection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2.  Terrorist Identification, Watch-listing, and Watch List 
Dissemination under HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Tables
Table 1.  Selected Lookout, Border Security, Criminal History, and 
Biometric Computer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
 
Terrorist Identification, Screening, and
Tracking Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6
Introduction
This report analyzes Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) and
issues relating to (1) the establishment of a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), (2) the
transfer of certain terrorist identification and lookout record distribution functions
from the Department of State to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and
the TSC, and (3) the consolidation of terrorist watch lists into a single, stand-alone,
terrorist screening database (TSDB) under the direction of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) at the TSC.  In recent hearings, Members of Congress have raised
several issues regarding the establishment of the TSDB.  For example, 
! Has the Administration committed enough resources to ensure the timely
establishment of an integrated terrorism watch list (the TSDB)?  
! Is the TSDB fast, accurate, comprehensive, and accessible?
!  Have procedures been established to allow persons, who may be misidentified
as terrorists or terrorist supporters, some form of redress and remedy if they
are denied civil rights or unduly inconvenienced by a screening agency?
! Does the establishment of the TSDB require new guidelines and oversight
mechanisms to protect privacy and other civil liberties?  Or, are existing
agency policies under which such data is collected sufficient?  
! Is the FBI the best agency to administer the TSDB? 
! Are the TSC and TSDB, and by extension the TTIC, temporary or permanent
solutions?  
While this report identifies some privacy issues associated with the
establishment of a consolidated terrorist screening database, it is not intended to
serve as an in-depth legal analysis of the issues related to national security, privacy,
and the government’s need for information to combat terrorism.  Rather, it is a
systematic examination of the mission and functions of the TSC in relation to other
entities like the TTIC.  It also identifies and describes key watch lists, residing in
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1A computer system is composed of computer(s), peripheral equipment such as disks,
printers and terminals, and the software necessary to make them operate together (according
to the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(ANSI/IEEE) Standard 729-1983).  A database is an organized body of machine readable
data that can be cross-referenced, updated, retrieved, and searched by computer.
2The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Subject:  Integration
and Use of Screening Information (Washington, Sept. 16, 2003).  Available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html].
3The Terrorist Screening Memorandum of Understanding accompanying HSPD-6 is
available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/09/tscmou.pdf].
4Presidents may exercise executive authority by issuing various kinds of directives.  Among
the oldest of these are executive orders and proclamations, both of which today are usually
published in the Federal Register.  For example, President George W. Bush established the
Office of Homeland Security and the initial Homeland Security Council with E.O. 13228
of Oct. 8, 2001.  With the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947, there have
emerged a series of variously denominated national security directives, but these are not
published.  Recently, President Bush inaugurated a similar series of Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, the first such being issued on Oct. 29, 2001.  While these homeland
security directives are not published in the Federal Register, they are available from the
White House Website and appear in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
For further information see CRS Report 98-61, Presidential Directives: Background and
Overview, by Harold C. Relyea.
5The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security
(July 2002), p. 57.
6The White House, Fact Sheet: New Terrorist Screening Center Established (Washington,
Sept. 16, 2003), at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-8.html].
several computerized systems and databases,1 that likely will be consolidated at the
TSC. 
HSPD-6 and Terrorist Watch List Consolidation
In HSPD-62 and an accompanying memorandum of understanding (MOU),3 the
Administration announced plans to establish the TSC, as a multi-agency effort to be
administered by the FBI, where several watch lists will be consolidated into a single
terrorist screening database (TSDB).4  The MOU on the Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism was signed by Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of Homeland Security
Thomas Ridge, and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet on
September 16, 2003.  The measures outlined in HSPD-6 and the MOU can be viewed
as an outgrowth of the Administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security,
which reported in July 2002 that the FBI would be establishing a consolidated
terrorism watch list that would be “fully accessible to all law enforcement officers
and the intelligence community.”5
According to the Administration’s timetable, the TSC was to be operational on
December 1, 2003.6  According to press accounts, however, the Administration
informed Representative Jim Turner, the ranking member of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, that the TSC was not “fully” operational as of the end of
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7Chris Strohm, “Congressman Blasts Bush on Terrorist Screening Efforts,” Government
Executive Magazine, Jan. 13, 2004, at 
[http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/011304c1.htm].
8This testimony was given by TSC Director Donna Bucella on Mar. 25, 2004, before a joint
hearing held by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security and the Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism.
9Watch lists are just that, lists of persons who are of interest to visa issuance and border
inspection agencies or law enforcement.  Persons may be on watch lists to prevent them
from acquiring a visa or to prevent them from entering the country, or both.  Persons can be
excludable from entry for reasons ranging from public health concerns to tax-motivated
citizen renunciates, in addition to being known and suspected terrorists, or their supporters.
They may also be wanted by law enforcement agencies for questioning or arrest.
10The TID is nearly identical to the system that section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act  for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2399) required the DCI to establish.
11There is no governmentwide definition of “sensitive but unclassified (SBU).”  Within
(continued...)
December 2003 and that the Nation’s multiple terrorist watch lists have yet to be
consolidated.7  On March 25, 2004, the TSC Director — Donna Bucella — testified
that the TSC had established an unclassified, but law enforcement sensitive TSDB.
In addition, the TSC was assisting federal screening agencies in identifying terrorists
and their supporters with greater certainty, and TSDB lookout records had been made
available to nearly 750,000 state and local law enforcement officers.8
The TSC is the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by the
Administration to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected
terrorists, and their supporters.  The other two are the FTTTF and the TTIC.
According to the Administration, the TSC complements the FBI-led FTTTF’s efforts
to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, and to track and remove them
if they manage to enter the country.  Under the oversight of the DCI, the TTIC serves
as a single locale where terrorism-threat data from all sources, foreign and domestic,
are further analyzed to more critically focus on terrorism.  As part of that function,
under HSPD-6, the TTIC will assume a greater role in identifying individuals who
are known, or suspected, to be terrorists, or their supporters.  
The Administration has transferred certain terrorist identification and watch list
functions previously performed by the Department of State’s (DOS’s) INR to the
TTIC and TSC.  Through a system known as TIPOFF, the DOS’s INR identified
known and suspected terrorists, produced lookout records, and distributed those
records for inclusion in consular and border inspection systems.  Prior to HSPD-6,
TIPOFF was the Nation’s principal terrorist watch list.9  Based in part on TIPOFF,
the member agencies of TTIC have built a TID into which all international terrorist-
related data available to the U.S. government will be stored in a single repository.10
With TID  records, the TSC is building a consolidated international terrorist watch
list, which will be merged with domestic terrorist watch list records, in the TSDB.
Under HSPD-6 the Administration plans to widen access to, and use of, watch
list records by making them available in a “sensitive but unclassified”11 format to
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11(...continued)
certain limits set out in statutes and presidential directives, agencies have discretion to
define SBU in ways that serve their needs to safeguard information that is unclassified but
should be withheld from the public for a variety of reasons.  The reasons for safeguarding
such information, are likely to include maintaining the privacy rights of individuals and the
integrity of ongoing inquiries and investigations.  A provision in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (§892 of P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2253) requires the President to implement
procedures to safeguard SBU information that is homeland security-related.  For further
information, see CRS Report RL31845, “Sensitive But Unclassified” and Other Federal
Security Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current
Controversy, by Genevieve J. Kneso.
12P.L. 108-177, Stat. 2622-2625.
13Until the establishment of DHS, federal border inspection services included the
Department of the Treasury’s Customs Service, the Department of Justice’s INS, the
Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the
Department of Health and Human Service’s Public Health Service.  The Homeland Security
(continued...)
authorized federal, state, local, territorial and tribal authorities; to certain private
sector entities; and to certain foreign governments.  
Hence, HSPD-6 has elevated and expanded the terrorist identification and
watch-list functions, which were previously performed by the DOS’s INR for
immigration-screening purposes.  Moreover, under HSPD-6, the use of watch lists
will be expanded to include data taken from on-going criminal and national security
investigations that are related to terrorism.  The purpose of these measures is to better
identify, watch-list, and screen known and suspected terrorists at U.S. consulates
abroad and international ports of entry.  Such measures could also better enable the
U.S. government to track terrorists within the United States if they manage to enter
the country.  Yet, at the same time, there are significant risks as well, not the least of
which is the potential loss of individual privacy and an erosion of civil liberties.  In
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,12 Congress has required the
President to report back to Congress on the operations of both the TTIC and TSC.
Terrorist Watch-Listing Prior to HSPD-6
A primary goal of lookout systems and watch lists has been to prevent terrorist
attacks, by excluding known or suspected terrorists and their supporters from entry
into the United States.  Under HSPD-6, the use of watch lists would be expanded to
better screen such persons at consular offices and international ports of entry, and to
better track them both abroad and, if they manage to enter the United States, at home.
Watch Lists and Lookout Books.  The DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs
(CA) and the federal border inspection services, until recently the U.S. Customs
Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have long maintained
watch lists (or lookout books) for the purpose of excluding “undesirable” persons
from the United States.  Customs and immigration inspection activities are now
carried out by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).13  While these watch lists/lookout books were just that
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Act dismantled INS and transferred its constituent parts, along with Customs and elements
of APHIS, to DHS.  The border inspection programs of these agencies have been
consolidated in DHS’s Border and Transportation Security Directorate, as the CBP.
14Following the establishment of the DHS, pursuant to P.L. 107-296 (116 Stat. 2135), the
Administration merged the investigation branches of the former INS and Customs Service
into ICE, along with the immigration detention and removal program, Customs Air and
Marine Interdiction program, and the Federal Protective Service.  More recently, the Air
Marshals program was transferred from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
to ICE.
15The Intelligence Community includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the National
Security Agency (NSA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (GIA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the other DOD
offices that specialize in national intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the
intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Air Force, the
FBI, the Department of Energy, and the Coast Guard; the INR at the DOS, the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis at Department of the Treasury, and elements of the DHS that are
concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information (50 U.S.C. §401a(4)).
 — bound paper volumes — the development of computers, computer software, and
computer connectivity/networking, allowed these agencies to develop and more
efficiently search watch list records during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Beginning in 1987, the DOS began keeping watch list (lookout) records on
known and suspected terrorists through a system known as TIPOFF.  While the DOS
had maintained computerized visa records since 1965, including watch lists, the
events surrounding the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 prompted the CA
to accelerate the development of the Consular Lookout and Security System
(CLASS), so that, among other records, TIPOFF-generated terrorist watch list records
could be more easily and efficiently searched by computer at U.S. consular posts and
embassies abroad.  Consular, intelligence, immigration, and law enforcement officers
nominate individuals for inclusion in TIPOFF.
The INS, meanwhile, maintained its own watch list database known as the
National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II) — a system that is
currently maintained by the DHS’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).14  While the bulk of NAILS II records are related to aliens who have either
been removed, failed to depart, or failed to show up for removal hearings, NAILS II
includes terrorism-related lookouts as well.  
In 1988, Congress mandated the development of the Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS).  This system, previously maintained by the Customs
Service, allowed the DOS, INS, and Customs to share watch lists, including terrorist
lookout records, at international ports of entry.  This system is currently maintained
by the DHS’s CBP.
Prior to HSPD-6, DOS’s INR culled through terrorism-related reports produced
by the Intelligence Community15 to identify individuals as known or suspected
terrorists, or their supporters.  INR also processed cables — known as Visa Vipers
—  from consular officers abroad when they learn of individuals associated with
CRS-6
16See testimony of Mary Ryan, former Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs,
Department of State, and Doris Meissner, former Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, before the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, Jan. 26, 2004.  At
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing7.htm].
17This definition of “terrorism” is taken from 22 U.S.C. §2656f(d).  U.S. Department of
State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Washington, Apr. 2003), p. xiii.
18P.L. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213.













Source:  Adopted by the Congressional Research Service from a Department of State presentation.
Figure 1.  TIPOFF and Immigration/Border Inspection Systems
terrorism.  And, INR processed similar data provided by federal law enforcement
agencies to produce terrorism-related lookout records.  These records were stored in
TIPOFF — a classified system.  Declassified TIPOFF records were then exported
into CLASS, IBIS, and NAILS II.  Also, lookout records produced by immigration
officers were exported from NAILS II into TIPOFF.  See Figure 1 below.
As underscored in recent public testimony, however, watch lists were only as
good as the information contained in them, and the agencies responsible for
producing these lookout records — principally DOS’s INR and DOJ’s INS — were
dependent upon the information they received from the Intelligence Community and
federal law enforcement.16 
Terrorism-Related Ground for Inadmissability.  According to the U.S.
government, the term “terrorism” means “the premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”17  Prompted by the
assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, Congress passed legislation
in 1903 to exclude from entry into the United States noncitizens who were anarchists,
or who advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.18  As a security
measure during the First World War, the DOS and Department of Labor (DOL)19
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19(...continued)
Department of the Treasury.  The immigration functions remained at Treasury until 1903,
when they were transferred by Congress to the Department of Commerce and Labor.  In
1906, the immigration and naturalization functions were consolidated in the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization.  In 1913, Congress transferred the Bureau to the newly
established DOL, splitting the immigration functions between a Bureau of Immigration and
a Bureau of Naturalization.  The immigration and naturalization functions were combined
again in 1933, as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  In 1940, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt transferred INS to the Department of Justice.  The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) abolished INS, transferring its immigration functions
to the DHS.
20Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559.
21Act of May 26, 1924, 43 Stat. 153, 156, 161.
22INA §§211, 212(a)(7), 221, 8 U.S.C §§1181, 1182(a)(7), 1201.
23INA §212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(i), as amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56).
24P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
25P.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
26P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
jointly issued an order in 1917, which required noncitizens to acquire visas from U.S.
Consuls abroad and present their visas and passports to U.S. inspectors upon arrival
in the United States.  This wartime requirement was codified in 1918,20 and was
made a permanent feature of U.S. immigration law in 1924.21  This requirement was
continued by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.22  
Visa issuance has long been viewed as a means of preventing undesirable
persons, including suspected spies, saboteurs and subversives, from entering the
United States.  In the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress amended and substantially
revised the grounds for exclusion in the INA, including new provisions related to the
exclusion of terrorists from the United States.23  These terrorist exclusion provisions
were subsequently amended and widened by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act24 and the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act in
1996,25 and by the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001.26
Under the INA, an alien is inadmissible if there is reasonable ground to believe
the alien (1) has engaged in terrorist activity; (2) is engaged or is likely to engage in
terrorist activity; (3) has, under certain circumstances, indicated an intention to cause
death or serious bodily harm, or incited terrorist activity; (4) is a representative of a
foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State, or a political,
social, or other similar group whose public endorsement of acts or terrorist activity
the Secretary of State has determined undermines U.S. efforts to reduce or eliminate
terrorist activities; (5) is a member of a foreign terrorist organization designated by
the Secretary of State; or (6) has used his/her position of prominence within any
country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, in a way that the Secretary of State
CRS-8
27P.L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978.  For more information on the process of designation of
foreign terrorist organizations and other related foreign terrorist lists, see CRS Report
RL32120, The “FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations; and CRS Report RL32223, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, both by Audrey
Cronin.
28Section 212(d) of the INA provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with authority to
waive the inadmissibility of members and supporters of foreign terrorist organizations, if it
is in the national interest to do so.  Under current law, such visa denial waivers would be
granted at the request of the Secretary of State.
29U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 107th Congress, 2nd sess.,
S.Rept. 107-351, H.Rept. 107-792 (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 12.
has determined undermines United States activity to reduce or eliminate terrorism
activities.27
Diplomatic Considerations.  More than 2½ years following the September
11, 2001 attacks, there is considerable momentum to watch-list additional persons
as known or suspected terrorists, or their supporters.  Nevertheless, the exclusion or
watch-listing of persons for ideological or political beliefs has long been a source of
controversy.  While it is clearly within the U.S. government’s mandate to screen and
track persons who are intent on inciting or engaging in terrorist activities, the
determination of who may be a member or supporter of a foreign terrorist
organization and, therefore, be prevented from entering the United States or be
subject to police surveillance is ultimately a subjective consideration made by
intelligence analysts and special agents based on the best information available.28  
Failures to Identify, Watch-List, and Screen 9/11 Hijackers
Despite measures following the first World Trade Center bombing to more
effectively identify and screen known and suspected terrorists, all 19 hijackers who
participated in the September 11, 2001 attacks had been issued visas by the DOS in
accordance with statutorily required watch-list name checks and other visa issuance
requirements, and had entered the country legally.  While watch lists will never
contain the names of all terrorists, it is generally agreed that members of the
Intelligence Community possessed sufficient information to watch-list at least two,
possibly three, of the al Qaeda hijackers.  Better use of watch lists may have at least
disrupted the activities of the  September 11, 2001 hijackers.
According to the congressional 9/11 Joint Inquiry, the Intelligence Community
missed repeated opportunities to watch-list two of the hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar
and Nawaf al-Hazmi.29  By January 2001, the CIA had identified al-Mihdhar and al-
Hazmi from surveillance photos of a major meeting of known al Qaeda operatives
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on January 5 and 8, 2000.  In the same month, the CIA
obtained a copy of al-Mihdhar’s Saudi passport.  It was also known that al-Mihdhar
CRS-9
30Ibid., p. 145.
31 Mujahadeen, in the sense used here, are fighters trained in insurgent and terrorist
techniques, often in training camps sponsored by or associated with al Qaeda.  In the context
of the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, the Mujahadeen were often Muslim men from other
countries who fought with the indigenous Afghan guerillas against the Soviets.  Some of
these Mujahadeen later formed the core of the al Qaeda movement.
32U.S. Congress, Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After The
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, p. 148.
33Ibid., p. 152.
34Ibid., p. 81.
had been issued a U.S. visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in April 1999, which was valid
through April 2000.  Nevertheless, the CIA did not watch-list him.30  
On January 15, 2000, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi entered the United States at Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX).  By March 2000, the CIA had learned that al-
Hazmi — an experienced Mujahadeen31 — had entered the United States through
LAX.  For about five months, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi stayed in San Diego, taking
flight lessons.  In addition to being in contact with an FBI confidential informant in
San Diego, they were also in contact with another  September 11, 2001 co-
conspirator —  Hani Hanjour, who subsequently piloted American Airlines Flight 77
into the Pentagon.  On June 10, 2000, al-Mihdhar departed the United States; on July
12, al-Hazmi applied to the INS for a visa extension.  Al-Hazmi moved to Phoenix,
AZ, linked up with Hanjour, and subsequently overstayed his visa.32
By late May 2001, the CIA transferred to the FBI the surveillance photos of the
January 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting.  While al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were
identified, along with Khallad bin-Atash, a leading al Qaeda operative and planner
of the USS Cole bombing, neither the CIA nor the FBI watch-listed them.  On June
13, 2001, with a new passport, al-Mihdhar obtained another U.S. visa in Jeddah.  He
falsely stated on the visa application that he had never been to the United States.  He
reentered the United States at John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport in New York City on
July 4, 2001.  
On the request of the CIA, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were watch-listed on
August 23, 2001 — less than three weeks before the  September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.33  While FBI agents in Phoenix and Minneapolis were following up other
leads that may have led them to the  September 11, 2001 conspirators, the repeated
failures by the Intelligence Community — principally the CIA and FBI — to watch-
list al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were crucial lost opportunities associated with the
September 11, 2001 attacks, according to the 9/11 Joint Inquiry.34 
More recently, the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, known as the Kean Commission for its Chair — Thomas H. Kean,
characterized these lost opportunities to watch-list al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi as
“failures.”  The Commission purports that there was evidence to watch-list Salem al-
Hazmi — Nawaf al-Hazmi’s brother as well.  Despite the efforts of key INR officials
who developed TIPOFF, the Kean Commission found that within the Intelligence
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Community “watchlisting” was not viewed as integral to intelligence work; rather it
was viewed as “a chore off to the side....”35 
Elevating and Expanding Terrorist Identification, Screening,
and Tracking under HSPD-6
On September 16, 2003, the White House issued HSPD-6, which set in motion
several measures to improve intelligence gathering and analysis on terrorists and their
activities by establishing additional mechanisms to ensure secure, effective, and
timely interagency information sharing.  In other words, getting the right information
to the right people, securely and at the right time.  The centerpiece of HSPD-6 is the
establishment of the TSC — the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by
the Administration to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected
terrorists, and their supporters.  The other two are the FTTTF and the TTIC, both of
which are described in greater detail below.36  
Besides establishing the TSC, HSPD-6 transferred the terrorist identification and
watch list functions previously performed by the DOS’s INR to the TTIC and TSC.
The TIPOFF system was developed by the DOS’s INR to identify, watch-list, and
screen terrorists and their supporters.  Consular, immigration, and customs officers
used TIPOFF-generated lookout records to exclude terrorists from entry into the
United States and, if they managed to enter, to remove them from the United States.
As part of its larger mission to assess terrorist threats, under HSPD-6, TTIC’s
member elements are now charged with identifying foreign terrorists as well.  The
TSC is charged with consolidating terrorist watch lists and making that data available
in a useful format to screening agencies, and the FTTTF, with assisting federal law
enforcement agencies with tracking foreign terrorists at home and abroad. 
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF).  On October 30, 2001,
President George W. Bush directed that the FTTTF be established as part of
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 (HSPD-2).37  On August 6, 2002, the
Attorney General placed the FTTTF administratively within the FBI.  As a multi-
agency effort, the mission of the FTTTF is to provide federal law enforcement
agencies with the best possible information to: (1) prevent foreign terrorists and their
supporters from entering the United States; and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or
remove them if they manage to enter the United States.  Since the issuance of HSPD-
2, the mission of the FTTTF has evolved.  While the FTTTF continues to assist
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40For further information on issues related to data mining, see CRS Report RL31798, Data
Mining:  An Overview, by Jeffrey W. Seifert.
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federal investigators in locating terrorism-related suspects, much of its original
mission to screen terrorists at ports of entry has been passed on to the TSC, as is
more fully described below.
In many areas, the FTTTF has facilitated and coordinated information sharing
agreements among participating agencies and commercial data providers.  By
accessing and analyzing this data, the FTTTF assists counterterrorism investigations
being conducted by the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force (National JTTF)38
and 84 regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).39  By data-mining public and
proprietary data systems, the FTTTF can track the “electronic footprints” of known
and suspected terrorists.40  In so doing, the FTTTF assists the 85 JTTFs nationwide,
the 56 FBI field offices, the 46 FBI legal attaches41 abroad, and the DHS in locating
suspected terrorists and their supporters.  
Besides the FBI, key FTTTF players include the DOD, the DHS CBP and ICE,
the DOS, the Social Security Administration, the Office of Personnel Management,
the Department of Energy, and the CIA.  The FTTTF has also established liaisons
with Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  The FTTTF was funded for
FY2004 as a stand alone line item in the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act
in the amount of nearly $62 million.42  Congress provided the same amount in
FY2003 as well.43  
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  In the State of the Union
Address, on January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the
establishment of the TTIC.  On the same date, the While House issued a Fact Sheet:
Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America, which outlined the Center’s
mission and functions.44  They include
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! to optimize the use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and
capabilities to conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies;
! to create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines;
! to integrate domestic and foreign terrorist-related information and form the
most comprehensive possible threat picture; and 
! be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for
our national leadership.
TTIC became operational on May 1, 2003.  John Brennan, a career CIA official,
was appointed by the Administration to be the Director of TTIC.  An FBI special
agent serves as the Center’s Deputy Director.  Funding for TTIC is provided by
participating agencies, including the DHS, DOS, DOJ, DOD, and the Intelligence
Community.  While TTIC is under the DCI, the Administration emphasizes that it is
a “multi-agency joint venture,” and is not part of the CIA.  TTIC’s mission is to form
the most comprehensive threat picture possible by serving as a central hub for the
fusion and analysis of all-source information collected from foreign and domestic
sources on international terrorist threats. 
TTIC’s operations will encompass elements of both the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division (CTD)45 and the DCI’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC).46  In September
2003, there were about 100 analysts on board at TTIC, and the Administration plans
to have about 300 analysts total on board in May 2004, when the Center is scheduled
to be moved to a location outside of the CIA.47  Collocating the DCI’s CTC and the
FBI’s CTD at TTIC is designed to encourage greater cooperation and information
sharing between the wider Intelligence Community and the FBI.48  
In the past, information sharing between the CIA and FBI has been hampered
by differing priorities and methods.  The CIA is banned from having any role in
domestic law enforcement or internal security functions by the National Security Act
of 1947,49 and the DCI is mandated to protect “sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure.”50  Like the CIA, the FBI also protects its sources and
methods — particularly the identities of confidential informants, so as not to
jeopardize on-going investigations.  
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(continued...)
The FBI, however, is also bound by other criminal laws and guidelines related
to protecting grand jury information and limiting criminal investigations, undercover
operations, and covert surveillance that are, in large part, designed to protect privacy
and civil liberties.  Consequently, the CIA takes a long-term strategic view of
intelligence gathering and analysis, while the FBI takes a short-term tactical view that
is geared towards resolving investigations.51  
Nevertheless, according to the Administration, TTIC will not collect
intelligence; instead, as the primary consumer of terrorism-related intelligence, one
of the Center’s core functions is to ensure information-sharing across agency lines.
TTIC is also responsible for setting requirements and tasking other federal agencies
in the area of shared databases.  The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring that
the FBI’s information technology modernization programs are configured to share
information easily with TTIC. 
In terms of more broadly disseminating intelligence reports, an administration
official has recently testified that TTIC’s Information Sharing Program Office has
worked to reduce the number of terrorism-related documents and records that are not
under “originator control,” meaning the information contained in those records could
compromise sources and methods.  Consequently, before another agency uses that
document or record, it must gain the permission of the originating agency.  
Other methods being employed more frequently at TTIC are “writing for
release” and “tear lines.”52  Writing for release means producing useful, but less
sensitive intelligence reports.  Tear lines are employed to divide reports.  The
substance of the information appears above the tear line, and the sources and methods
by which the information was acquired appears below the tear line.  
To effect rapid interagency information-sharing, TTIC has established a
classified web-accessible service — TTIC Online.  TTIC is developing less sensitive
mirror images of TTIC Online to more broadly disseminate information and analysis
to appropriate entities.53  See Figure 2 below.
TTIC will also establish and maintain the TID, which will be a repository for
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as becoming the primary source for international terrorist data provided by TTIC to
the TSC.  Such information will include names, aliases, dates and places of birth,
identification and travel documents, unique and distinguishing physical features,
biometric data, and individuals’ past affiliation with terrorist acts or groups.  In the
past, much of this information was stored in disparate databases maintained by
several agencies.  Consolidating and expanding this data could remedy systemic
weaknesses that in the past prevented intelligence analysts and investigators from
positively identifying known and suspected terrorists. 
To build the TID and prevent duplication of effort, functions of the DOS Bureau
of Intelligence and Research’s TIPOFF system — particularly those aspects related
to the identification of foreign terrorists — have been transferred to TTIC.  The entire
TIPOFF database of about 120,000 names is now the core of the TID.  TIPOFF staff
have been split, with part going to the TTIC and part going to the TSC.  Under
HSPD-6, the President directed all heads of executive departments and agencies to
provide to TTIC on a continual basis all appropriate data regarding terrorists and
related activities to the extent that the law allows.  In turn, TTIC is to provide the
TSC with all appropriate information.  See Figure 2 below.
TTIC and IAIP Reporting Requirements.  Unlike the FTTTF, the
establishment of TTIC has generated some controversy.55  Some Members of
Congress have questioned whether the functions currently assigned to TTIC, like
intelligence fusion and threat assessment, would not be better housed in DHS’s
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), as the
Homeland Security Act gave responsibility for all-source terrorist threat analysis to
the new department.56  In September 2003, William Parrish — the former DHS
Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis — testified that DHS will
overlay TTIC-generated threat assessments on IAIP-identified vulnerabilities, so that
protective measures can be developed and implemented.57  In other words, with
TTIC-generated threat information, IAIP could be better equipped to identify and
prioritize the nation’s critical infrastructure that needs to be more closely guarded so
that security resources can be more efficiently deployed. 
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Regarding the respective roles of the DHS’s IAIP and the DCI’s TTIC, Section
359 in Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200458 requires the President
to submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress59 by May 1, 2004, on
the operations on both the IAIP Directorate and TTIC.  This provision sets out that
this report should include the following elements:
! an assessment of the operations of the IAIP and TTIC;
! an assessment of the ability of TTIC to carry out the responsibilities assigned
to it by the President;
! an assessment of the ability of IAIP to carry out the responsibilities assigned
to it under section 201 of the Homeland Security Act;60
! an action plan to bring TTIC to full operational capacity as outlined in the
President’s State of the Union address, including milestones, funding, and
sources of funding;
! a delineation of responsibilities and duties for the IAIP and TTIC;
! a delineation and summary of overlapping areas of responsibilities and duties
carried out by IAIP, TTIC, and any other element of the federal government;
! an assessment of where these areas of overlap, if any, represent an inefficient
use of resources;
! a description of the policies and procedures adopted by IAIP and TTIC to
ensure compliance with the Constitution, any applicable statues, executive
orders, and regulations of the United States;
! an assessment of the practical impact that TTIC operations, if any, may have
on individual liberties and privacy; and
!  any other information the President deems appropriate that provides a fuller
explanation as to why TTIC should be established as a “joint venture” of
participating agencies rather than as an element of IAIP.
This provision sets out further that the report be presented in an unclassified format,
which may include a classified annex if necessary.
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).  According to the Administration, the
primary mission of the TSC is to consolidate all federal terrorist watch lists into a
consolidated terrorist screening database, so that all federal agencies would have
access to the best and most complete information.  A TSA official, Donna Bucella,
has been detailed to the FBI and appointed head of the TSC.  A DHS official,
Richard Kopel, has been appointed second-in-command at the TSC.  As a multi-
agency effort, the Center’s staff will include designees from the DOS, DOJ, and
DHS, as well as other intelligence community entities.  TSC personnel are to be
given access to TTIC databases, including the TID, as well as any relevant
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Figure 2.  Terrorist Identification, Watch-listing, and Watch List Dissemination under HSPD-6
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Under HSPD-6, the Administration envisions that terrorist watch lists will be
used much more frequently in the future.  In the past, terrorism-related watch lists
were used principally for purposes of screening noncitizens applying for visas abroad
at consular offices and at the border when applying for admission at international
ports of entry.  Today, as described more fully below, state and local law enforcement
officers are able to screen persons stopped for routine traffic violations against
terrorist TSDB lookout records.  See Figure 2 above.
The TTIC Director, the TSC Director, the heads of federal departments or
agencies, or their designees “nominate” persons for inclusion in the TSDB by
notifying either the TTIC or the FBI.  The TSC Director is responsible for
establishing procedures to review these records when new information is developed
concerning the persons about whom the records are maintained.  According to the
Administration, TTIC is providing international terrorism data, and the FBI is
providing domestic terrorism data for inclusion in the TSDB.  Both sets of data are
merged in the TSC-maintained TSDB.
According to the FBI, international terrorists include those persons who carry
out terrorist activities under foreign direction.  For this purpose, they may include
citizens or noncitizens, under the rationale that citizens could be recruited by foreign
terrorist groups.  Or, noncitizens (aliens) could immigrate to the United States and
naturalize (become citizens), having been unidentified terrorists before entry, or
having been recruited as terrorists sometime after their entry into the United States.
By comparison, domestic terrorists are not under foreign direction, and operate
entirely within the United States.  According to the Administration, when
appropriate, both sets of data will include information on “United States persons.”61
Criteria for the inclusion of U.S. persons in the database will be developed by an
interagency working group.  The term “United States persons” includes U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents (immigrants).
For agencies responsible for screening terrorists, the TSC Director and agency
designees will determine the “screening processes” that will be supported and the
amount and type of data that will be provided, depending on an agency’s mission.
Based on recent congressional testimony, it is clear that the TSC is supporting the
screening missions of the DOS’s CA and DHS’s CBP.  It is less clear how much
support the TSC is providing the DHS’s TSA and  ICE.  To determine whether to
allow screening agencies access to certain records, the TSC is to consider, but not be
limited to, the following elements:
! the nature of the person’s association with terrorism;
! the quality of data, including credibility, reliability, and extent of
corroboration;
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! the extent of uniquely identifying personal data;
! the authority or authorities under which the data were obtained, and any
restrictions on how these data may be shared or used;
! the authority or authorities of the screening entity;
! the circumstances, including changes in the Homeland Security Alert Level,
under which screening will occur; and 
! the action the screening agency will take if a person is identified as a person
in the TSC’s terrorist screening database.
These elements serve as a rough guide to what should be included in lookout
records.  Nevertheless, HSPD-6 does not speak to the issue that the FBI-administered
TSC will need to fully assess the missions of many different agencies in order to
provide the appropriate amount of information and handling codes in the lookout
records, which will then be disseminated from the consolidated TSDB.  While
departmental and agency designees will have a voice at the table, and each agency
will determine which known or suspected terrorists are placed in the respective
lookout systems under HSPD-6, the FBI will be the lead agency and likely play an
important role in the final decision.  
Expanding Use of Terrorist Watch Lists.  Prior to September 11, 2001,
watch lists were used principally for federal border and transportation security, and
law enforcement.  In HSPD-6, the Administration has clearly signaled that the use
of watch lists will be expanded beyond those purposes traditionally associated with
border and transportation security, and federal law enforcement.  Under HSPD-6, to
the extent permitted by law, the consolidated TSDB will be made available to:
! state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
! other appropriate state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities;
! private sector entities charged with managing critical infrastructure or
organizers of large events (e.g., the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics); and
! foreign governments that have entered into immigration agreements with the
United States or that are engaged in the global war on terrorism as partners
with the United States.  
As described below, the Administration has made such records available to state
and local law enforcement, and plans to make such records available in limited cases
with foreign governments through the FBI’s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) in a sensitive but unclassified format.  NCIC is an FBI-administered
telecommunications system that allows authorized law enforcement officers,
including state and local officers, to access and search several automated databases
pertaining to fugitives, missing persons, stolen property, and criminal histories.
In regard to noncitizens, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary
of Homeland Security, or their designees at the TSC, is to determine which records
are entered into NCIC.  For all other persons, the Attorney General is to determine
which records relating to alleged terrorists are entered into NCIC.  The Secretary of
Homeland Security, or his TSC designee, is to determine whether such records
should be available to other non-law enforcement authorities at the state, local,
territorial, and tribal levels for other purposes.  Such purposes may include screening
persons when they apply for driver’s licenses or licenses to transfer hazardous
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material.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary
of DHS, and the DCI, will determine which records will be made available to foreign
governments.  
TSC Level of Operations.  According to the Administration’s timetable,
TSC operations were to be phased in rapidly, and the center was to be operational by
December 1, 2003.62  According to press accounts, however, the Administration
informed Representative Jim Turner, the ranking Member of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, that the TSC was not “fully” operational as of the end of
December and that the Nation’s multiple terrorist watch lists had yet to be
consolidated.63  Director Bucella publically testified that the TSC was operational on
December 1, 2003.64  According to that testimony, as part of phase one, the TSC has
had the ability to
! provide the names and identifying information of known or suspected
terrorists to federal, state, and local law enforcement;
! review whether a known or suspected terrorist should be included in the
agency watch lists or should be deleted from such lists;
! ensure that persons, who may share a name with a known or suspected
terrorist, are not unduly inconvenienced by screening processes conducted by
the U.S. government; and
! adjust or delete outdated or incorrect information to prevent problems arising
from misidentifications.65 
On March 25, 2004, Director Bucella testified before a joint hearing of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security
Subcommittee and the Select Homeland Security Committee’s Intelligence and
Counterterrorism Subcommittee.66  In that testimony, Director Bucella reported that
phase two of the TSC’s implementation had been completed and an unclassified but
law enforcement sensitive TSDB had been established.  As of April 1, 2004, the
TSDB contained about 79,289 lookout records.
Through March, the TSC had provided DOS’s CA with 54,000 security advisory
opinions, of which 90 were related to terrorism, and 56 resulted in visa revocations.
In addition, the CBP’s National Targeting Center Director, Charles Bartoldus,
testified that CBP officers were routinely working with the TSC to evaluate and
assess potential matches between terrorist lookout records and individuals applying
for admission into the United States.  With TSC’s assistance, CBP inspectors are
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currently able to resolve potential matches more expeditiously, resulting in the more
timely release of individuals who have been misidentified.  Members also asked
Director Bucella about the TSC’s interactions with the DHS’s TSA, but it was less
clear from her responses whether TSA was consulting with the TSC about terrorism-
related hits in the Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System. 
Furthermore, TSDB-generated lookout records are currently being disseminated
to state and local law enforcement officers through the NCIC.  The unclassified
portion of TSDB-generated lookout records (name, date of birth, passport number,
and country of origin) have been loaded into the NCIC’s Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organizations File (VGTOF).  According to Director Bucella, the TSC has set up a
protocol for when NCIC queries by state or local law enforcement officers result in
a terrorism-related hit.  
When NCIC terrorism-related hits occur, the state and local officers stand by,
while their dispatchers contact the TSC.  Through the dispatchers, the TSC operators
will elicit certain information from the state or local officers to determine whether
there is a match.  Such information could include identifiers, like height, weight, eye
color, hair color, tattoos, or scars, which may be classified.  If the TSC deems that a
match has been made, the TSC will contact the FBI Counterterrorism Watch unit (CT
Watch unit) at FBI headquarters.  
If needed, the CT Watch unit will contact and consult the appropriate JTTF and
designated case officer.  Following such consultations, the TSC operators will
provide the state and local officers with the most appropriate course of action.  Such
actions include four possible scenarios: arrest, detain and question, question and
release, or proceed with normal police procedure.  According to Director Bucella, the
TSC is able to process most state and local NCIC terrorism-related hits within 20 to
30 minutes.
The TSC is presently engaged in a large-scale outreach program to inform state
and local law enforcement agencies about the TSC.  Some Members at the hearing,
however, questioned whether most state and local agencies were aware of the TSC
or the changes to NCIC’s VGTOF.  They also questioned whether some federal law
enforcement units, like the Border Patrol, had access to NCIC, and whether such
queries were routinely made on aliens attempting to enter the country between ports
of entry.
As part of this outreach process, the TSC is also working with those agencies
to determine if the TSDB could be incorporated into screening processes conducted
by those agencies.  In addition, the TSC is contacting other federal agencies to
determine whether they have terrorism-related records that would be of use to the
TSC.  In this regard, several members raised concerns that the Department of
Defense had not done enough to transfer terrorism-related data to the TSC, and
possibly the TTIC, concerning al Qaeda and Taliban combatants who had been
previously detained at Guantanamo, but who had subsequently been released.
Director Bucella indicated that some data regarding these persons had been
transferred to the TSC.  
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Director Bucella outlined phase three of the TSC implementation.  By
December 2004, the TSC is scheduled to use the TSDB as a single, integrated system
for entering known and suspected terrorist identities.  At that point, the TSDB will
be  integrated (“dynamically linked”) into all appropriate screening processes.  In
addition, selected private sector entities, such as operators of critical infrastructure
facilities or organizers of large events, will be allowed to submit lists of persons
associated with those events to the U.S. government to be screened for any
connection with terrorism.  Meanwhile, the DOS is working to establish mechanisms
by which terrorist screening information can be shared with foreign countries
cooperating with the United States in global efforts to counter terrorism.
Legal Safeguards.  The TSC Director is responsible for developing policies
and procedures related to criteria for inclusion into the database; and measures to be
taken in regard to misidentifications, erroneous entries, outdated data, and privacy
concerns.  As described above, according to TSC Director Bucella, procedures have
been developed regarding the inclusion of persons in the TSDB, the correction of
erroneous data, the purging of outdated data, and the incorporation of new data to
prevent further misidentifications of persons who share the same or similar names as
persons for whom terrorism-related lookout records exist.  
The Administration maintains that since the TSC does not collect intelligence,
and has no authority to do so, that all intelligence or data entered into the TSDB has
been collected in accordance with the preexisting authorities of the collecting
agencies.  Nonetheless, these existing agency policy and procedures probably do not
address information sharing with private entities for security purposes.  Members of
Congress and other outside observers have questioned whether there should be new
policy and procedures at different levels (such as, visa issuance, border inspections,
commercial aviation security, domestic law enforcement, and security of public
events) for the inclusion of persons in the TSDB.67
Also, Members have asked how a person would find out if they were in the
TSDB, and if so, how did they get there?  In congressional testimony, Director
Bucella surmised that a person would learn of being in the TSDB when a screening
agency encountered them and, perhaps, denied them a visa or entry into the United
States, or arrested them.  Director Bucella also suggested that the TSC would
probably be unable to confirm or deny whether the person was in the TSDB under
current law.  
Consequently, persons who have been identified or misidentified as terrorists
or their supporters by the TSC would have to pursue such matters through the
screening agency.  However, the screening agency might not have been the source of
the record in which case, a lengthy process of referrals may have to be initiated.
Under such conditions, persons identified as terrorists or their supporters may turn
to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or the Privacy Act as a last alternative.
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Under FOIA,68 any person, including a noncitizen or nonpermanent resident,
may file a request with any executive branch agency or department, such as the DOS
or DHS, for records indicating they are on a watch list.  Under national security and
law enforcement FOIA exemptions, the Departments may withhold records on
whether an individual is on a watch list.69  
In addition to a FOIA request, a citizen or legal permanent resident may file a
Privacy Act70 request with DHS and/or Justice to discern whether the TSA or the FBI
has records on them.  However, the law enforcement exemption under the Privacy
Act may permit the Departments to withhold such records.  Under the Privacy Act,
a citizen or legal permanent resident may request an amendment of their record if
information in the record is inaccurate, untimely, irrelevant, or incomplete.  Under
both FOIA and the Privacy Act, there are provisions for administrative and judicial
appeal.  If a request is denied, the citizen or legal permanent resident is required to
exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in U.S. District
Court to challenge the agency’s action.
The Administration has pledged that terrorist screening information will be
gathered and employed within constitutional and other legal parameters.  While the
Privacy Act generally does not restrict information-sharing related to known and
suspected terrorists who are not U.S. persons for the purposes of visa issuance and
border inspections, it does restrict the sharing of information on U.S. persons
(citizens and legal permanent residents) for purely intelligence purposes, who are not
the subject of on-going foreign intelligence or criminal investigations.71 
Consequently, legal questions concerning the inclusion of U.S. persons in these
systems under criminal or national security predicates may arise.  Protocols have
been established for state and local law enforcement to cover the eventuality that a
positive NCIC VGTOF hit indicates that they have encountered a known or suspected
terrorist.  However, it is unclear whether protocols have been established for false
positives if a person is misidentified.  In addition, questions of compensation for
persons mistakenly damaged by inclusion in these databases will likely be an issue.
TSC Reporting Requirements.  Section 360 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200472 requires the President to submit a report to
Congress by September 16, 2004 on the operations of the TSC, as established under
HSPD-6.  This provision sets out that this report should include the following
elements:
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! an analysis of TSC operations to ensure that the TSC does not violate the
Constitution, or any statute, executive order, or regulation of the United
States;
! a description of the TSC database architecture, including the number of
databases  operated or maintained by the TSC, and an assessment of the extent
to which these databases have been integrated;
! a determination of whether the data from all the watch lists, enumerated in the
GAO report entitled Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should
be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing (described
below), have been incorporated into the consolidated terrorist screening
database system;
! a determination of whether any other databases ought to be integrated into the
consolidated terrorist screening database; 
! a schedule setting out the dates by which identified databases, which are not
yet integrated into the consolidated terrorist screening database system, would
be integrated into that system;
! a description of the protocols that have been established to ensure the
protection of classified and sensitive information that is contained within the
consolidated terrorist screening database;
! a description of processes that have been established to ensure that the
information in the consolidated terrorist screening database is systematically
and frequently reviewed for timeliness and accuracy;
! a description of the mechanism that has been established to ensure that the
information in the consolidated terrorist screening database is synchronized
and replicated throughout that database;
! a description of the extent to which, and the criteria under which, the TSC
makes the information in the consolidated terrorist screening database
available to the private sector and critical infrastructure components;
! the number of individuals listed in the consolidated terrorist screening
database;
! the estimated budget of, and sources of funding for, the TSC for each of the
fiscal  years 2004, 2005, and 2006;
! an assessment of the impact of the TSC and the consolidated terrorist
screening database on current law enforcement systems;
! the practical impact, if any, of TSC operations on individual liberties and
privacy; and 
! such recommendations as the President deems appropriate for modifications
to law or policy to ensure the continued operations of the TSC.
This provision requires further that the report be presented in an unclassified format,
which may include a classified annex if necessary.
Selected Watch List, Criminal, and Biometric Systems
To provide border and transportation security, a number of federal agencies have
long maintained watch lists, or lookout books, for the purposes of excluding certain
“undesirable” aliens, including known and suspected terrorists, from travel to, and
entry into, the United States.  These watch lists reside on consular and border
management computer systems, as well as on criminal history record computer
systems.  In addition, to identify individuals with greater certainty, several biometric
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systems have been developed in parallel with these systems.  It is notable that most
of these systems were developed separately and for different purposes that reflect
agency-specific missions and legal authorities.
The U.S. government’s principal terrorist watch list system has been the DOS’s
TIPOFF system, which is classified.  While the other members of the Intelligence
Community have begun culling through their intelligence reports and producing
additional lookout records, prior to September 11, 2001, the staff of INR’s TIPOFF
produced by far the lion’s share of terrorist lookout records.  For the purposes of visa
issuance and border inspections, TIPOFF lookout records are loaded into two
unclassified systems:  CA’s CLASS and DHS’s IBIS.  
CLASS is a computerized system used to manage visa applications, among
other consular-related activities.  Border inspectors use the IBIS system to process
travelers entering the United States at international ports of entry.73  Many agencies
compile watch lists for law enforcement and other purposes, which are also loaded
into IBIS.  Hence, inspectors act as agents of these agencies when processing
travelers.  As an integrated system, IBIS allows inspectors to seamlessly and
simultaneously search several law enforcement and border management databases.
While data sharing between some of these systems is routine, with others it is
not.  For example, declassified lookout records are downloaded from TIPOFF and
uploaded into the DOS CLASS system and the NAILS II, a legacy INS system that
is currently maintained by DHS’s ICE.  Prior to TIPOFF’s transfer, this was done
weekly, but priority cases could be uploaded into IBIS within minutes if needed.  At
the TSC, it will be done daily, if not more often.  In turn, NAILS II records are
uploaded into TIPOFF, since immigration officers produce terrorist-related lookout
records as well.  It is likely that these practices will be continued at the TSC, but it
is unknown how frequently or in what manner they will be accomplished.  Until
required to by the USA PATRIOT Act, the DOJ was unwilling to share criminal
history records with the DOS, including terrorist lookout records contained in NCIC.
Merging watch lists will not likely require integrating entire systems.
Nonetheless, there are likely to be other technological impediments.  For example,
from system to system, and watch list to watch list, there remains no standardization
of data elements, such as, name, date of birth, place of birth, or nationality.  In the
past decade, digitized biometrics (principally fingerprints) have been used
increasingly to identify individuals with greater certainty, but most biometric systems
have been developed separately from other systems.  Integrating data from biometric
systems, such as IAFIS and IDENT, into either the TID or the TSDB could be
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technologically difficult and costly.  Under HSPD-6, the TTIC director has been
charged with the responsibility for setting uniform system standards for watch list
records.
At the same time, while elevating and expanding the terrorist watch list function
under HSPD-6 is an important step in the wider war on terrorism, specialists in the
area of national security have observed that homeland (border) security could be
improved by upgrading and integrating existing consular/immigration and border
management systems, criminal record history systems, and biometric systems.74  
GAO Watch List Recommendations.  In April 2003, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report that included findings and several
recommendations regarding terrorist watch lists.  GAO found that at least nine
agencies maintained 12 terrorist and criminal watch lists that were used principally
for border security or law enforcement purposes.  GAO reported that data sharing
was hampered by incompatible system architectures — computer hardware, software,
and networking.  Therefore, GAO recommended that a central authority (leadership),
spanning several departments and agencies, be made responsible for standardizing
and consolidating watch lists.  According to GAO, the new system should be
developed to allow agencies to effectively carry out their missions by enforcing all
relevant laws in their unique operational environments.75  At a minimum, lookout
records from at least some of these systems (described below) would likely be
incorporated into the TSDB.
Of the 12 systems listed by GAO that include watch lists, nine are described
below.  Table 1 below lists these nine systems and the departments and agencies
responsible for maintaining them.  The systems that GAO listed, which are not
described below, include the U.S. Marshals’ “wants and warrants” file, the U.S. Air
Force Office of Special Investigations’ Top 10 Fugitive List, and U.S. Central Bureau
for Interpol’s terrorism watch list.  These lists were not included in the treatment
below because:  the Marshals’ wants and warrants file is incorporated into NCIC; the
Air Force list is small by comparison to the rest; and Interpol records were reviewed
by the FBI and INR for inclusion in NCIC and TIPOFF.  At the TTIC, it is likely that
Interpol records will continue to be reviewed for inclusion in the TID and, by
extension, in the TSDB.
While not included in the GAO study, the Regional Information Sharing
System/Law Enforcement Online (RISS/LEO) is described below, because state and
local investigators support this system.  Not only could RISS/LEO be used to share
lookout records with state and local law enforcement, but investigative files could
also be shared in some cases.  In terms of biometric technology, two systems figure
prominently, IAFIS and IDENT.  Furthermore, Justice has recently built a biometric
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capability into NCIC.  Brief mention is also given to State’s Consolidated Consular
Database, which serves as a central repository for all visa applications, including
digitized visa photos and, in some cases, fingerprints.
Table 1.  Selected Lookout, Border Security, Criminal History,
and Biometric Computer Systems
Department Agency System
State Bureau of Intelligence and Research TIPOFF
State Bureau of Consular Affairs Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS)
DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
National Automated
Immigration Lookout System II
(NAILS II)
DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Interagency Border Inspection
System (IBIS)
DHS Transportation Security Administration Selectee Process (CAPPS)
DHS Transportation Security Administration No Fly List (CAPPS)
Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation National Crime Information
Center (NCIC)
Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS)
DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
and Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
IDENT
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
TIPOFF.76  TIPOFF is a classified computer lookout system, which was
maintained by the DOS’s INR to identify and watch-list known and suspected
terrorists.77  Created in 1987, it originally consisted of 3x5 index cards in a shoe box.
TIPOFF staff used specialized computer search engines to systematically cull through
all-source data, from highly classified central intelligence reports to intelligence
products based on open sources, to identify known and suspected terrorists.  These
classified records are scrubbed to protect intelligence sources and methods, and
biographic identifiers are declassified, and exported into lookout systems (CLASS
and IBIS).  Consular officers can query these records electronically in CLASS to
deny visas to terrorists and their supporters.  Immigration and customs inspectors
query these records in IBIS to deny terrorists entry into the United States at
international ports of entry.  
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assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and watch-listed, yet he was issued
a visa in Khartoum, Sudan.  At the time, the Khartoum consulate lookout records were on
microfiche and there were several variations of Rahman’s name.  He was convicted for his
part in the conspiracy to blow up the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and the United Nations
Headquarters, in New York City.
Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Visa Viper process was
established, as a dedicated/secure telegraphic channel that allows consular and
intelligence officers to report known and suspected terrorists to INR for inclusion in
TIPOFF.  There are more than 120,000 records of terrorists and other criminals in
TIPOFF, nearly double the number on September 11, 2001.  Due to the use of aliases
among terrorists, some of these records involve the same individuals.  There are
nearly 81,000 distinct individual terrorist names in TIPOFF.  
Until recently, all subjects of TIPOFF records were non-U.S. persons — roughly
speaking those persons who are not legal permanent residents (immigrants) or
citizens of the United States.  Under HSPD-6, the terrorist identification process
currently performed by INR will be expanded and transferred to TTIC.  A mirror
image of INR’s TIPOFF system has been built at TTIC to feed terrorist lookout
records into a terrorist identities database (TID).  Since September 11, 2001, other
members of the Intelligence Community have combed through their products and
case files to identify additional terrorists who should be excluded from entering the
United States.  As part of these efforts, records on U.S. persons (citizens and legal
permanent residents) who are the subject of ongoing criminal or national security
investigations will be entered into the TID as well.  The process performed by INR
of declassifying lookout records and exporting them to the appropriate consular,
border security, and law enforcement agencies has been transferred to TSC.  
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).78  The CLASS system
is the DOS’s principal unclassified lookout database that is used by consular officers
abroad to check the names of visa and passport applicants against several watch lists
that are maintained for various purposes, including screening known and suspected
terrorists.  While the DOS has maintained an automated visa lookout system since
1970, the development of CLASS was accelerated after the first World Trade Center
bombing and the conspiracy to blow up the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and the
United Nations Headquarters, in New York City.79  
In terms of name recognition, the CLASS system is the most advanced lookout
system currently maintained by the federal government.  It includes a compressed
name search capability, as well as sophisticated Arabic, Russian/Slavic, East Asian,
Hispanic, date of birth, and country of birth algorithms.  The language algorithms,
for example, search for variations in name spelling based on the phonetic
transliteration of names from other languages into the Roman alphabet.  The
algorithm scores the searches to arrange them in order of likelihood of a match.  All
consular posts can directly access CLASS online.  There are about 15.4 million
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records in CLASS, including 90,000 records on suspected or known terrorists and
their supporters.80
National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II).81  The
NAILS II system is the lookout system formerly maintained by INS, until that agency
was dismantled and its constituent parts were transferred to DHS.  Today, NAILS II
is maintained by the DHS’s ICE.  NAILS II contains about 3.8 million files,
including biographical and case data on persons who may be inadmissible or are
being sought by immigration officers for other reasons related to immigration
enforcement.  Of these files, 58,000 files concern suspected or known terrorists and
their supporters.  The NAILS II system can be searched by name, variations on the
name, alien registration number, and date of birth.  The name recognition technology
in NAILS II is Soundex, a technology that was patented some 100 years ago.82
Lookout records are downloaded from TIPOFF and uploaded into NAILS II on an
hourly basis, and from NAILS II into CLASS on a weekly basis, or as needed.  At the
TSC, this process will be performed daily.
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS).83  The IBIS system, an
unclassified system, was maintained by the Department of the Treasury’s U.S.
Customs Service, until Customs was transferred to DHS.  INS was also a major
stakeholder in this system, since both Customs and Immigration inspectors screen
aliens for admission into the United States at ports of entry.  
The IBIS system was congressionally mandated by the Omnibus Drug Initiative
Act of 198884 in order to share lookout records maintained separately by INS, State,
and Customs.  The Customs Service supported about 17 different watch lists by
downloading lookout records from other agencies into the IBIS.  IBIS provides
inspectors with the ability to perform a single, all purpose query in the primary
inspection lanes.85  If the system generates a hit, the inspector diverts the traveler to
secondary inspection for additional clearance procedures.  Developed by the Customs
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Service, IBIS utilizes the pre-existing TECS II.  Today, TECS II and IBIS are
maintained by the CBP at DHS.86
IBIS exchanges data with CLASS and several immigration systems, including
the NAILS II (described above) and the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS),
among others.  It also allows inspectors to access the FBI’s NCIC and National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), as well as the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Identification System
(NADDIS).  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), U.S.
Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) also provide lookout records for inclusion in IBIS.  Law enforcement and
regulatory personnel from 20 other federal agencies use IBIS.  
In addition, the Advanced Passenger Inspection System (APIS) was grafted onto
IBIS to establish alien entry/exit control in the airport environment (as opposed to
land border and sea ports).  As required by the Border Security Act (P.L. 107-173),
the DHS has rolled out the U.S. VISIT program, a newly developed automated
entry/exit control system that includes scanners and readers to verify and collect
biometric information on foreign travelers.87  Under the U.S. VISIT program, IBIS
and the APIS interface with two systems with biometric capabilities, IDENT and the
Consular Consolidated Database.
As in NAILS II, the name search capability in IBIS is Soundex.  While IBIS is
considered superior to NAILS II in terms of systems performance and name
recognition, it is not considered as robust as the CLASS system in terms of certain
search functions.  There are about 16 million records in IBIS, including nearly 80,000
records on known and suspected terrorists.  In regard to IBIS another key issue for
Congress is systems availability.  There have been press accounts that IBIS has been
inaccessible at certain ports of entry for extended periods of time, during which
allegedly foreign travelers were not screened against watch lists.88 
Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS).89  TSA
administers the CAPPS system, a classified system, which includes a “selectee”
process and a “no fly” list.  The operational concept underlying CAPPS is to select
“high-risk” travelers based on ticket purchasing patterns, among other things, for
greater scrutiny in terms of body and baggage searches, while expediting processing
for “low-risk” travelers.  The “selectee” process is the core of CAPPS.  It was
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authorized in the 1996 Federal Aviation Administration Act.90  The system was
mandated in 1999 by the Federal Aviation Administration, prior to the establishment
of TSA, to promote aviation security following several aircraft bombings.  In
addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act91 authorized the development
of a  “no fly” list, which is essentially a list of persons who are prohibited from
boarding a commercial aircraft for a host of reasons.  The actual system, however,
was developed and is managed by the airline industry. 
More recently, TSA has been testing a second generation system, CAPPS-II,
that, among other things, uses sophisticated algorithms to data mine (search)
government and proprietary (commercial) databases to acquire limited background
information on air travelers to authenticate their identity.  Critics point out that
terrorists could “beat” the system by adopting another person’s identity.  They point
to the increasing frequency and ease with which criminals engage in identity fraud.
In addition, the system will assign travelers a color coded categorical risk
assessment.92  
! Green-coded passengers would not be considered a risk and would only be
subject to basic screening procedures — metal detectors and baggage x-rays.
! Yellow-coded passengers would be deemed either unknown or possible risk,
and would be subject to extra screening procedures — bag and body searches.
! Red-coded passengers would be considered high risk and would not be
allowed to travel, and law enforcement officials would be notified of their
attempts to board commercial aircraft.
Critics, however, decry the cloak of secrecy under which TSA is developing
CAPPS II.  They assert that identity-based profiling under CAPPS II would result in
a loss of privacy that would not be counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in
security.  Because of these fears, others maintain that transparency is vital to the
system’s further development and success.93  Some legal scholars also question
whether it would be permissible to prevent a person from boarding an aircraft on a
mere suspicion of organizational affiliation.94 
Congress, meanwhile, included Section 519 in the FY2004 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act,95 which prohibits the expenditure of any funding provided under
that act to deploy or implement this new system until it has been evaluated by GAO.
Since then, GAO has reported that the development of this system is behind
schedule, and TSA has encountered major impediments in testing CAPPS II.  In
particular, the European Union and commercial airlines have been reluctant to hand
CRS-31
96U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385, Feb.
2004, p. 4.
97Federal Register, Aug. 1, 2003, p. 45266.
98For further information, click on [http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic.htm].
99U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Crime Information
Center 2000 (Washington, July 15, 1999), p. 3 at
 [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressre199/ncic2000.htm]
100Briefing with DOS’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Oct. 23, 2003.
over crucial data because of privacy concerns.  Moreover, GAO underscored that the
CAPPS II, as designed, would be vulnerable to terrorists who adopted (stole) another
person’s identity.96  TSA anticipates that CAPPS-II will be integrated with US-
VISIT, DHS’s newly developed automated entry/exit control program.97  Such a
measure would introduce a biometric component into the CAPPS-II process for non-
citizens, so that their identities could be confirmed with greater certainty.
National Crime Information Center (NCIC).98  The FBI maintains the
NCIC, a national computer database for criminal justice records.  NCIC is linked to
an index system — the Interstate Identification Index (III), which points authorized
law enforcement authorities to federal, state, and local criminal records.  In 1999,
NCIC 2000 was brought online by the FBI.  Major improvements built into NCIC
2000 include an improved name search capability, digitized right index finger prints
and mug shots, other digitized images (tatoos, scars, or stolen vehicles), a sexual
offenders file, an incarcerated persons file, a convicted person on supervised release
(probation or parole) file, user manuals on line, information linking capabilities,
online system support, and other improvements.  
Another major enhancement associated with NCIC 2000 is the ability for patrol
officers to receive and send data to the system from their patrol cars or other
temporary locations with laptop computers, hand-held fingerprint scanners, or digital
cameras.  The total budget to develop NCIC 2000 was about $183 million.99  For
FY2003, about $36 million was allocated by the FBI to administer and maintain
NCIC 2000.  
NCIC 2000 gives law enforcement officers access to over 43 million records:
41 million criminal history records and 2.5 million hot files.  Hot files would include
lookouts on suspected and known terrorists, which are included in the Violent Gang
and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF).  As in IBIS and NAILS II, however, the
name recognition technology in NCIC 2000 is Soundex, which is not nearly as robust
as the name recognition technologies built into CLASS.  For example, the length of
the name field in NCIC is only 28 characters, while it is over 80 in CLASS.100
For years, Justice denied the DOS access to NCIC on the grounds that CA was
not a law enforcement agency, but State was given authority to access NCIC in the
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USA PATRIOT Act.101  As of August 2002, between 7 to 8 million files on non-U.S.
persons with FBI criminal records were added to CLASS from NCIC.102  When
Customs and Immigration inspectors query IBIS in the primary inspection lanes, the
system queries NCIC’s hot files like the U.S. Marshal Service’s want and warrants
file and the VGTOF, but full criminal background history checks are only performed
when travelers are diverted into secondary inspections for certain irregularities or
suspicious behavior.  Under HSPD-6, NCIC is the platform on which additional
terrorist screening records from the TSC’s TSDB have been disseminated to duly
authorized state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies.103 
Regional Information Sharing System/Law Enforcement Online.104
The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) is an unclassified, but secured
web-accessible system of six regional computer networks that were established to
share state and local investigative data involving criminal gangs and drug
trafficking.105  RISS is funded through the DOJ Office of Justice Programs, but is
administered and operated jointly by several state agencies.  
Section 701 of the USA PATRIOT Act106 amends the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to authorize the use of RISS to share investigative data
that might involve potential terrorist conspiracies and activities.  As required by law,
criminal files included in RISS must be based on “probable cause” that the subjects
of the file have committed, or are about to commit, a crime.107  While a cigarette
bootlegging conspiracy, for example, may appear to have no terrorism nexus, by
analyzing investigative data in RISS, other patterns of criminal or terrorist activity
may emerge.  
Law Enforcement Online (LEO) is a secured web-accessible portfolio of
applications and information sources made available by the FBI to state and local law
enforcement agencies.  More recently, RISS has been merged with the FBI’s LEO
system.  The RISS/LEO merger will facilitate federal/state communications on a
secured/web accessible system, as opposed to older teletype systems like the
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Security, GAO-03-174, Nov. 2002, p. 149.
110IDENT is instrumental in identifying how many times an alien has been apprehended.
According to the DOJ, however, there are legal concerns, about entering such data into
criminal databases like IAFIS for aliens who may have attempted to enter the United States
illegally, but were not convicted of a criminal violation.  Indeed, most aliens attempting to
enter the United States illegally between ports of entry are apprehended up to five to seven
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NLETS.108  Through RISS/LEO, the FBI will distribute to state and local law
enforcement agencies selected open source (unclassified) reports, as well as sensitive
but unclassified law enforcement reports.  RISS/LEO enjoys considerable support
among state and local law enforcement agencies as a user-friendly and web-
accessible system. 
Biometric Systems for Identity Verification.  “Biometrics” are physical
characteristics or personal traits of an individual used to identify him, or verify his
claim to a certain identity.  Examples of biometrics include fingerprints, facial and
hand geometry, iris and retina scans, voice recognition, and handwritten signatures.
While most biometric technologies have only been developed in the past 10 to 15
years, fingerprints have been used by law enforcement to verify identity for the past
century.  For these purposes, the FBI maintains the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), an automated 10-fingerprint matching system that
captures rolled prints.  All 50 states are connected to IAFIS.  With over 47 million
sets of fingerprints, it is the largest biometric database in the world.109  
In 1995, the INS piloted the Automated Biometric Fingerprint Identification
System (IDENT) in California.  In the following year, IDENT was deployed to over
34 sites on the Southwest border, and over 3,000 criminal aliens were identified
attempting to enter the United States.  IDENT is a two flat fingerprint system that
includes prints of 4.5 million aliens who have been (1) apprehended while attempting
to enter the United States illegally between ports of entry or allowed to withdraw
their application for admission at a port of entry (4 million records), (2) previously
apprehended (300,000 records), or (3) convicted of aggravated felonies (240,000).
Some Members of Congress, particularly those serving on the Appropriations
Committees, were concerned that two incompatible fingerprint identification systems
were being developed within the DOJ.  This issue became heated following
revelations that the INS had apprehended a suspected murderer, Rafael Resendez-
Ramirez, but allowed him to voluntarily return to Mexico.  Resendez-Ramirez
subsequently reentered the United States and committed four additional murders.
Language in the FY2000 Commerce-Justice-State appropriations act expressed
dismay that other federal, state and local law enforcement officers did not have
access to IDENT data.  In response, the Attorney General put the IDENT/IAFIS
migration project under the supervision of Justice Management Division (JMD).
JMD conducted several pilot programs, which examined the feasibility of
interchanging data between the two systems.110  For example, IAFIS data for
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times before they are charged with misdemeanor illegal entry.  If they are subsequently
apprehended, they are charged with felony reentry.
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individuals in the “wants and warrants” file was downloaded into IDENT.  JMD also
developed an IDENT/IAFIS workstation that allowed Border Patrol agents and
immigration inspectors to run IDENT prints against IAFIS.  This system had a 10
minute response time and required agents to process each apprehended person twice,
once under IDENT and again through the IDENT/IAFIS work station.  
In addition, JMD conducted a criminality study, which examined IDENT
records from the 1998 through mid-2000 time frame and found that about 8.5 % of
those individuals had some notable charge placed against them.111  The transfer of the
components of the former INS to the DHS, however, has hampered this project.
According to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General, despite a delay of two years,
a partially integrated version of the IDENT/IAFIS system was available for
deployment in December 2003.  Full integration and deployment of the system,
however, may extend past FY2008.112  Meanwhile, about 4,500 FBI fingerprint files
of known or suspected terrorists have been entered into IDENT.113
The DOS, meanwhile, has established the capacity at consular posts abroad to
capture electronic records of nonimmigrant visas, including digitized visa photos,
which are transmitted and replicated in State’s Consolidated Consular Database.  In
FY2001, DOS and INS conducted a pilot nonimmigrant visa data-sharing program
at the Newark International Airport.  As part of this program, nonimmigrant visa
records were transmitted to IBIS, including digitized photos.  These visa photos are
useful for identity verification, and reportedly this capability has been deployed at all
air ports of entry.  
In addition, the DOS has begun testing facial recognition (biometric)
technologies with nonimmigrant visa photos as a means to verify identity as well, but
these technologies are less mature than those using fingerprint.  As a biometric
measurement for nonimmigrant visa applicants, however, the DOS strongly favors
facial recognition to fingerprints, because it does not require the applicant to submit
to an active measurement procedure.  In addition, facial recognition biometric
measurements can be derived from photos and videotape gathered by the intelligence
community in order to identify known terrorists and other persons who may be
excludable from the United States for national security reasons.
HSPD-6 directs that the TTIC’s TID and the FBI domestic terrorist database
incorporate all available biometric data, to the extent permitted by law, including data
on persons yet to be identified (e.g., latent prints gathered at a crime scene or the
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caves of Afghanistan).  In addition, these systems are to be designed so that new
advancements in biometrics technology can be incorporated into them.
Possible Issues for Congress
While watch lists have long been maintained by law enforcement and border
security agencies, the Administration’s plans to expand these lists and widen their
dissemination raises issues related to individual privacy and the security of the
nation.  For Congress, several immediate issues have emerged or may emerge,
including the following:  
! Has the transfer of the TIPOFF terrorist identification function to TTIC and
TIPOFF terrorist watch list function to the TSC been accomplished without
degrading the capabilities of other governmental entities charged with
identifying, screening, and tracking known and suspected terrorists?  If not,
how and in what way has the system been improved?  
! How operational is the TSC at this time?  Will the TSDB be fully integrated
(“dynamically linked”) with the visa issuance, border inspection, commercial
aviation security systems by the end of CY2004?  Has the Administration
committed enough resources to create a single, fully integrated TSDB?
! With the bulk of the Nation’s terrorism-related lookout records in a single,
integrated TSDB, what measures have and will be taken to insure the security
of the TSDB?
! Will the TSC Director have a role in evaluating the security and adequacy of
the systems used by screening agencies?  
! What measures have been or will be taken to improve the name search
capabilities of NCIC and IBIS?
! How expeditiously will the TSC be able to respond to terrorist-related NCIC
hits made by state and local law enforcement officers?  Is there a bench mark
for how long such persons can be stopped for questioning?
! If persons identified as known or suspected terrorists, or their supporters, are
not arrested or detained, what governmental entities will be notified of their
presence in the United States?  What measures will be taken to monitor their
whereabouts and activities while in the United States?  What other actions
might be taken by those to whom the information is disseminated?
! What is the criteria for including persons in the TSDB as suspected or known
terrorists, or their supporters?  Will sufficient safeguards be put in place to
protect constitutional rights?  Should policies and guidelines regarding the
inclusion of such persons in the TSDB be made public?
! What redress is or will be available to an individual wrongly placed on a
watch list?  Will there be a formal appeals process?  If so, what agency will
handle this process?
! What mechanisms will be put in place to audit system users to determine
whether they are abusing the system?  Should there be associated civil or
criminal penalties for such abuse?
! Should Congress consider requiring a statutory authorization for the TSC, the
consolidated TSDB, and related activities as a means of assuring greater
accountability?  
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! Are there cultural or tradecraft issues related to information sharing that the
FBI and other agencies will need to overcome in order to more effectively
share information and properly manage lookout records for other agencies? 
! Would the database and watch list functions be better located and consolidated
in a single Executive Branch agency with clearer lines of authority and
responsibility?  
! Finally, are the TSC and TSDB, and by extension the TTIC, temporary or
permanent solutions?  
Conclusion
There is an emerging consensus that the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
community missed several vital opportunities to watch-list and screen several
conspirators involved in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Under HSPD-6,
the Bush Administration has taken steps to elevate and expand terrorist identification
and watch-list functions.  These measures, if effectively implemented, will better
equip the U.S. government to screen and monitor the whereabouts of known and
suspected terrorists, and their supporters.  Furthermore, working from common
terrorist identities and watch list databases could be an effective mechanism to break
down institutional and cultural firewalls and promote greater interagency cooperation
and data sharing.
Conversely, as the U.S. government pursues a more aggressive policy in
identifying and watch-listing known and suspected terrorists, and their supporters,
there is significant potential for a corresponding loss of privacy and an erosion of
civil liberties.  While the Administration asserts that such information will be
collected according to preexisting authorities and individual agency policies and
procedures, it is inevitable that individuals will be misidentified.  In such cases, most
would agree that it will be incumbent upon the U.S. government to act swiftly to
correct such mistakes, and perhaps compensate those individuals for their
inconveniences or possible damages.
Establishing a TSDB by merging watch lists will not likely require integrating
entire systems.  Nonetheless, there are likely to be technological impediments to
merging watch list records.  From system to system, and watch list to watch list, there
remains no standardization of data elements, such as, name, date of birth, place of
birth, or nationality.  In the past decade, moreover, digitized biometrics (principally
fingerprints) have been developed to identify individuals with greater certainty, but
most biometric systems have been developed separately from other systems.
Integrating data from biometric systems into either the TID or the TSDB could be
technologically difficult and costly. 
Under HSPD-6, the Administration has established the TSC as a “multi-agency
effort.”  At the same time, establishing a consolidated TSDB and effectively
disseminating lookout records to screening agencies, including state and local law
enforcement, is not likely to be a small or short-term endeavor.  At this time,
congressional input into this process is confined to oversight by several congressional
committees and appropriating funding to several participating agencies.
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Appendix A.  Frequently Used Abbreviations
To aid the reader, the following list of abbreviations is provided.
APIS Advanced Passenger Information System
CA Bureau of Consular Affairs
CAPPS Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CBP Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System
CT Watch Counterterrorism Watch
CTC CIA’s Counterterrorism Center
CTD FBI’s Counterterrorism Division
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOL Department of Labor
DOS Department of State
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force
HSPD-6 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Inspection System
IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System
ICE Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IDENT Automated Biometric Fingerprint Identification System
INA Immigration and Nationality Act
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
JMD Justice Management Division
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
LEO Law Enforcement Online
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NAILS II National Automated Border Inspection System II
NSA National Security Agency
NCIC National Crime Information Center
NJTTF National Joint Terrorist Task Force
NTC National Targeting Center
RISS Regional Information Sharing System
TID Terrorist Identities Database
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSC Terrorist Screening Center
TSDB Terrorist Screening Database
TTIC Terrorism Threat Integration Center
U.S.-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program 
VGTOF Violent Crime and Terrorist Organization Fil
